Abstract: This paper studies the consequences of labor-market frictions for the real e¤ects of steady in ‡ation when cash is required for households'consumption purchases and …rms'wage payments. Money growth may generate a positive real e¤ect by encouraging vacancy creation and raising job matches. This may result in a positive optimal rate of in ‡ation, particularly in an economy with moderate money injections to …rms and with nonnegligible labor-market frictions in which wage bargains are not e¢ cient. This main …nding holds for a wide range of money injection schemes, with alternative cash constraints, and in a second-best world with pre-existing distortionary taxes.
Introduction
The real e¤ect of money growth and the welfare cost of steady in ‡ation have been two central issues in monetary economics since mid-1960s. Due to their simplicity, dynamic general equilibrium models with cash-in-advance constraints have been the most prototypical setups to address these issues. 1 Even when cash is required only for consumption purchases, Wang and Yip (1992) establish a negative real e¤ect of steady in ‡ation in the presence of labor-leisure trade-o¤ when capital and labor are Pareto complements in production. Their conclusion remains valid under the endogenous growth framework, as shown by Gomme (1993) , Jones and Manuelli (1995) , and many others. In our paper, we revisit this issue by examining whether steady in ‡ation may foster real activity and whether the optimal in ‡ation rate may depart from the Friedman rule if the underlying labor market is subject to search and entry frictions. The incorporation of labor-market frictions is particularly relevant because the central force for generating a negative real e¤ect of money growth is the laborleisure trade-o¤, which depends naturally on labor-market conditions.
It is noted that the empirical evidence fails to lend consistent support to a negative relationship between steady in ‡ation and real economic activity. For example, while conventional studies by Fischer(1983) and Cooley and Hansen (1989) document such a negative relationship in cross countries, recent works by Bullard and Keating (1995) and Ahmed and Rogers (2000) …nd zero or even positive correlation between money and output growth in low-in ‡ation industrialized economies.
Moreover, empirical evidence seems to suggest that the real e¤ect of anticipated in ‡ation is largely insigni…cant when the level of in ‡ation is low. 2 In our paper, we provide a plausible theory to explain the empirical …ndings: a positive real e¤ect of money growth might be present in low-in ‡ation regimes when the economy lacks a central planner (or Walrasian auctioneer) and exhibits labor-market frictions. More precisely, by allowing labor-market frictions and several important dimensions of labor-related trade-o¤s, our paper identi…es a new channel that characterizes the long-run e¤ects of in ‡ation on employment and capital accumulation. This new channel may account for di¤erent consequences of money growth on the macroeconomic variables as well as for normative prescriptions that depart from the Friedman rule, 1 Lucas (1980) shows money superneutrality in a one-sector neoclassical growth framework when only consumption purchases require cash in advance. By requiring investment purchases to use cash, Stockman (1981) identi…es a negative real e¤ect of money growth via discouragement to capital accumulation. By allowing in ‡ation uncertainty in a Lucasian monetary economy, Dotsey and Sarte (2000) …nd insigni…cant real e¤ects of money growth. 2 For example, Khan and Senhadji (2000) …nd that in ‡ation signi…cantly reduces growth only when the level of in ‡ation is above 1-3% for developed countries and above 7-11% for developing countries.
yielding important monetary policy implications.
Speci…cally, we follow the idea developed by Diamond (1982) , Mortensen (1982) , Pissaridis (1984) and Laing, Palivos and Wang (1995) by postulating that both vacancy creation and job search are costly and that vacancies and job seekers are brought together by a matching technology exhibiting constant returns to scale. We depart from this prototypical random search and matching setup to consider competitive search that was developed by Peters (1991) and extended by Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) . This framework allows us to model capital accumulation under a dynamic general equilibrium setting in a tractable manner while allowing for market frictions highlighted in search and matching models.
Since the purpose of our paper is to examine the consequence of labor market frictions for in ‡ation and growth in a monetary economy, our model also depart from the Merz-Andolfatto framework in two aspects. 3 On the one hand, we follow the neoclassical transactions-time monetary model by assuming that costly activities such as vacancy creation and job search intensity are all in terms of labor and time allocation. This feature enables us to assess thoroughly the real e¤ects of steady in ‡ation via the labor-leisure-search trade-o¤ in the presence of labor market frictions.
On the other hand, rather than focusing exclusively on Hosios' (1990) rule of e¢ cient matching, we also consider the possibility of an ine¢ cient bargain whereupon a …rm, facing an outside option normalized to zero, decides whether to accept a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of an additional employee by a "large" household. In so doing, we obtain an equilibrium income distribution resembling the neoclassical benchmark, thus enabling better understanding about the role of labor-market frictions (in lieu of strategic bargaining) played in the long-run relationship between steady in ‡ation, employment and economic welfare and providing more clear contrast with …ndings in frictionless neoclassical models. In short, our model structure permits various crucial decisions: …rm's vacancy creation (intensive margin) and household's labor participation (extensive margin) as well as search intensity (intensive margin). The interaction between extensive margin and intensive margin is magni…ed by the matching technology where vacancies and searching workers are complementary to lead to thick matching, which may be referred to as the matching externality e¤ ect.
The punch-line …nding is that in addition to the conventional negative e¤ect of steady in ‡ation on real activity via labor-leisure trade-o¤, money growth may generate positive real e¤ects on employment and output. Speci…cally, higher money growth raises the cost of holding money, thus 3 It should be noted that while Andolfatto and Merz study how labor market frictions in ‡uence the e¤ect of technology shocks on the business cycle in a real production economy, our paper examines the long-run real e¤ect of steady in ‡ation under monetary exchanges.
reducing real money balances held by households and …rms and restricting purchases that require cash in advance (household consumption and …rm wage payment). A direct consequence is to encourage …rms to shift from "production"to "non-production"activities, devoting more manpower to vacancy creation and maintenance. As a result, the job …nding rate facing each searching worker is higher. While the shift from production to non-production activities lowers …rm's labor demand, a higher job …nding rate raises job matches and the steady-state level of employment. When there are at least some moderate amount of money being injected to …rms and when agents'responses to labormarket frictions are su¢ ciently strong, the matching externality e¤ect dominates the conventional labor demand e¤ect and hence equilibrium employment rises. This therefore creates a channel for higher money growth to induce possibly higher welfare: the betterment in job matching generates a large time saving e¤ect in job search by the households, resulting in su¢ ciently higher leisure to outweigh the modest drop in consumption. The welfare-maximizing in ‡ation rate could be positive, departing from the Friedman rule. A positive optimal rate of money growth can never arise in a standard cash-in-advance model with labor-leisure choice in the absence of labor market frictions.
The results of positive real e¤ects of money growth and positive rate of optimal in ‡ation may be established when …rms and households are responsive to labor market frictions, which is more likely in relatively low in ‡ation regimes, with low job …nding rates, and under ine¢ cient wage bargains.
These …ndings remain robust, over a wide range of money injection schemes, under alternative cash constraint setups, and with pre-existing distortionary taxes in a second-best world.
The Model
Time is discrete. The basic economy features three theatres of economic activities: a continuum of identical in…nitely lived competitive …rms (of measure one), a continuum of identical in…nitely lived households (of measure one) and a (passive) monetary authority. All individual agents have perfect foresights. There are two productive factors: capital and labor, both owned by households. Firms and households exchange in both goods and factor markets. The goods market is Walrasian and the capital market is perfect, but the labor market exhibits search/entry frictions. While each …rm can create multiple vacancies and each household can choose search intensity endogenously, both vacancy creation and search intensity are costly.
To avoid complexity involved in managing the distribution of the employed, the unemployed and their respective cash holdings, we adopt the "large households" framework proposed by Lucas (1990) . Speci…cally, each household can be thought of containing a continuum of "members" who are employed (workers) and unemployed (job seekers or searching workers), with the sum of their mass normalized to unity. All members pool their income as well as their enjoyment of the fruit of employment (consumption) and unemployment (leisure). Vacancies and job seekers are brought together through a Diamond (1982) type matching technology, where the ‡ow matches depends on the masses of both matching parties. Each vacancy can be …lled by exactly one searching workers.
At an exogenous rate, …lled vacancies and workers are separated every period and separated workers immediately become job seekers.
Finally, the monetary authority is passive, determining nothing but the issuance of (…at) money and the rule of money injections. In order to o¤er a direct comparison with Lucas (1980) and Wang and Yip (1992) , we consider a benchmark with cash required only for …rm's wage payments and household's consumption purchases, where …rm's spending in capital rental and household's spending in capital investment are not subject to cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints. In Section 4.1,
we will discuss the implications of relaxing these assumptions.
Firms
At period t, a representative …rm rents capital k t (beginning-of-period measure) from households at a gross rental rate r t and employs labor n t at a real market wage rate w t to produce a single …nal good y t under a constant-returns Cobb-Douglas technology. Not all employed workers at the representative …rm are devoted to production. A mass of workers of measure are employed solely to maintain the vacancies v t , which can be thought of covering the costs of posting vacancies, managing personnel-related documentations, as well as providing and maintaining the o¢ ce space. Since such costs are likely to exhibit scale economies, we postulate: (v t ) = v " t , where " 2 (0; 1) re ‡ects the scale economies and > 0 captures any exogenous shift in the cost of vacancy management. Accordingly, the measure of workers used for manufacturing is n t (v t ) and the output of the representative …rm can now be speci…ed as:
, with 2 (0; 1) and A > 0:
Let be the (exogenous) job separation rate and t be the (endogenous) employee recruitment rate. Since each vacancy can be …lled by only one worker, the in ‡ow of workers to employment is t v t and the out ‡ow is n t . Employment within the representative …rm thus evolves according to the following birth-death process: n t+1 n t = t v t n t , or, by rearranging terms:
Denote the nominal money stock held by the representative …rm at the beginning of period t as M F t , the aggregate price level prevailed in period t as P t , and the rate of in ‡ation from period t 1 to period t as t . Further denote by m F t the real money balances held by the representative …rm at the beginning of period t:
. De…ne the incremental holding of nominal money
Then, the incremental holding of real money balances is given by:
, or, rewriting in forms of the evolution of real money balances by the representative …rm:
We assume that …rms must hold money to …nance their wage payments, that is, the following CIA constraint must hold true: W t n t M F t . Since vacancy creation and maintenance require labor inputs, the above speci…cation implies that the …rm's expenses on labor in both production (W t (n t (v t ))) and vacancy activities (W t (v t )) are cash constrained. By rewriting, the …rm's CIA constraint becomes P t w t n t m F t P t 1 , or,
Notably, since matching is not instantaneous in this frictional labor market, employment becomes a state (rather than control) variable. Therefore, given real money injection x F t de…ned as
Pt and under constraints (1), (2) and (3), the representative …rm will, facing the state (n t ; m F t ), choose vacancies, capital demand and incremental real money balances (v t ; k t ; z F t ) to maximize its value, (n t ; m F t ), which is the sum of the discounted real pro…t ‡ows y t w t n t r t k t z F t + x F t (inclusive of net bene…ts related to money holding). Applying the standard dynamic programming techniques, we can express the representative …rm's optimization problem in Bellman equation form as:
subject to constraints (1), (2) and (3).
Households
Facing a pooled resource, the representative "large" household has a uni…ed preference capturing enjoyment of all its members: the employed, whose fraction is n t , and the unemployed, whose fraction is 1 n t . The employed is assumed to work full time (normalized to one), while the unemployed are divided into job searchers, whose fraction is s t and leisure takers, whose fraction is 1 s t . Thus, the overall fractions of workers, job seekers and leisure takers are n t , s t (1 n t ) and
(1 s t )(1 n t ), respectively.
The representative household value both consumption, c t , and leisure, (1 s t )(1 n t ). Under this framework, it is obvious that not all unemployed time can be regarded as leisure, because search intensity takes away such an enjoyment. Accordingly, the representative household's preference can be written in a standard time-additive form as:
where > 0 and U (c t ; (1 s t )(1 n t )) = c
Since the household owns capital k t and holds real money balances m H t , its budget constraint must include both capital investment and incremental holding of real money balances z H t :
. The incremental holding of real money balances is:
Let 2 (0; 1) denote the constant rate of capital depreciation. Given the market rental and wage rates (r t ; w t ), consumption, gross capital investment (k t+1 k t + k t ), and incremental real money balances can be supported by wage and rental income, plus real money injection x H t :
Denote by t the (endogenous) job …nding rate. Recall that each vacancy can be …lled by only one worker, so the in ‡ow of workers to employment t s t (1 n t ) net of the out ‡ow n t must be equal to incremental employment. Thus, similar to those speci…ed in the …rms decision above, employment in the household perspective evolves according to:
With only consumption requiring cash, the CIA constraint facing the household becomes:
The representative household's optimization problem in Bellman equation form is then:
subject to constraints (5), (6) , (7) and (8).
The Aggregate Economy
A main departure from the real-business cycle search framework is that we do not impose Hosios'
(1990) rule of e¢ cient matching for …rms and workers to share the surplus. Instead, we follow closely the neoclassical distribution of income. Speci…cally, we consider each …rm's outside option as 0 . Under competitive search, 0 must be treated as given by all individuals. We then consider that a large household makes a take-it-or-leave-it-o¤er of a potential employee to the …rm with wage demand w. Normalizing 0 = 0 yields a "zero pro…t" solution, which is a special benchmark bargaining outcome. This enables us to focus exclusively on the consequence of labor market frictions (rather than strategic bargaining) for in ‡ation and growth to contrast with …ndings in frictionless neoclassical models. In Section 4.2, we shall return to the case of e¢ cient matching under Hosios' rule to further elaborate the role of e¢ cient bargain played in the welfare cost of in ‡ation.
Since the goods market is perfectly competitive, all …rms must reach zero pro…t in equilibrium:
Because there is only a single good in the economy, the resource constraint requires that aggregate goods supply must be equal to aggregate goods demand, which is the sum of consumption and gross investment:
While the capital market is perfect as in the conventional Walrasian models, the labor market exhibit search frictions. Given the job separation rate and the aggregate ‡ow matches E t , aggregate employment evolves according to the following birth-death process:
Similar to Diamond (1982) , the aggregate ‡ow matches depend on the masses of both matching parties, namely, search intensity augmented job seekers, s t (1 N t ), and vacancies, V t . Assume the matching technology exhibits constant-returns-to-scale property, as suggested by the empirical evidence in Blanchard and Diamond (1990) using the U.S. data. We can specify:
where B > 0 measures the degree of matching e¢ cacy and 2 (0; 1).
Since each vacancy can be …lled by exactly one searching workers, the tightness of the labor market to …rms, denoted t , can be measured by the ratio of vacancies to searching workers:
We can then rewrite the aggregate ‡ow matches in terms the current employment, the search intensity and the tightness of labor market to …rms:
Using (15) and (14), we obtain the employee recruitment rate ( t ) and the job …nding rate ( t ):
Thus, the tighter the labor market is to …rms, the lower the employee recruitment rate and the higher the job …nding rate are. An increase in job seekers'search intensity crowds out job seeking opportunities and hence reduces the average job …nding rate, although it eases …rms' recruiting process by raising their employee recruitment rate.
Finally, we specify the monetary authority's money injection rules. While we follow the convention assuming that money is injected in a lump-sum fashion, we permit a general money injection rule that nests the proportional injection rule commonly used in the literature (cf. Lucas 1972 and many subsequent studies) as a special benchmark. Speci…cally, let g , we then have:
There are three special cases of interest: (i) benchmark proportional injection: H t = 0; m t =m H t . Combining zero pro…t condition with resource constraint, we can easily see that aggregate incremental money holdings must be equal to aggregate money injections, yielding the money market equilibrium condition:
Equilibrium
In this section, we focus on a steady-state analysis, examining how an increase in money growth would a¤ect, in the long run, the key economic variables such as employment, output, capital-labor ratio as well as the variables related to search such as probabilities of job matching, search intensity and vacancy rate. We will also discuss the optimal money growth rate in terms of output and welfare considerations.
The constraints in the representative …rm's optimization problem consist of two evolution equations on the state variables, n and m F , and a CIA constraint on wage payments. The constraints in the representative household's optimization problem consist of the laws of motion for three state variables, k, n and m H , and a CIA constraint on consumption. Both optimization problems can be solved using standard dynamic programming techniques. For brevity, we relegate the mathematical details to the Appendix. Instead, we will proceed with solving and characterizing the steady-state analysis in our model. It will become clear that more assumptions are necessary in order for us to secure the uniqueness of the steady state.
Steady State
To economize on notations, we will, in the rest of the paper, use small-case letters without time subscript to denote the equilibrium aggregate variables in a steady state. Since we are interested in the long-run perspective and will not look into the transitional dynamics, this abuse of notations should not cause any confusion.
Labor-market matching in the steady state implies:
which can be used with other labor-market relationships, (15) , (14), (16) and (17), to obtain the steady-state Beveridge curve,
as well as the steady-state number of vacancies, search intensity and market tightness measure:
It is clear that in the steady state, the in ‡ation rate equals the money growth rate: = g. From the de…nition of incremental real money holdings and under the general money injection rule, we have:
Combining the budget constraint (6) and the zero pro…t condition (10) yields,
where it can be easily veri…ed that
Under perfect foresight, the two CIA constraints both hold with equality in the steady state. Thus,
In the steady state, the real interest rate is pinned down by,
which, together with the capital demand condition, yields the familiar modi…ed golden rule:
Using (27), (31) and (37), we can express the real wage as:
We then write aggregate consumption as:
Substituting these two expressions above into (28) and (29) yields the money holding ratio of households to …rms:
We turn next to three important trade-o¤ and equilibrium conditions. As shown in the Appendix, the vacancy creation-production trade-o¤ is captured by,
whereas the relative money injection to …rm and the zero pro…t condition become,
Ak (n (v))
We then arrive at the following condition governing the labor-leisure trade-o¤ (see the Appendix),
To understand the channels through which economic aggregates are a¤ected by the rate of money growth in the steady state requires thorough investigation of the role played by labor market frictions. As a part of such frictions, vacancy creation and maintenance are costly. Thus, the equilibrium wage determined by the zero pro…t condition (37) must be lower than the marginal product of labor (M P N ), given by,
with D measuring the wage discount. However, various money injection schemes may lead to redistribution between …rms and households. As a result, the wage discount D can be larger or smaller than the vacancy cost ratio
n . From (31), (37), and (39), these two measures are related as follows:
from which we can see that
n under the proportional money injection rule ( F = 1).
Another equation that relates w and D comes from equation (35) that captures the vacancy creation-production trade-o¤:
The impact of a higher money growth rate, g, on equilibrium wage-marginal product ratio, (41), respectively. Since M P N is determined by k=(n (v)) and is, according to (31) , independent of g, so is line WD. On the other hand, the line VCER will be a¤ected by g depending on the money injection rule (to be further elaborated in the next subsection). Thus, we can solve explicitly from WD and VCER for the wage discount as a function of the money growth rate (see the Appendix):
It can be readily seen that, if the scale economies of vacancy creation is su¢ ciently large such that
The equations determining the steady state can be re-arranged in a recursive fashion that is conducive to perform comparative statics. Essentially, we could obtain two equations determining and n. The rest of endogenous variables can then be derived easily. The …rst of the two equations has to do with the vacancy creation-production trade-o¤ (35) , and is henceforth named the VP locus:
whereD
which summarizes the channel through which money growth a¤ects the vacancy creation-production trade-o¤. Notice that other thanD(g), the VP locus takes the same form regardless of the money injection rule. The second of the two equations comes from the labor-leisure decision (38), and is henceforth named the LL locus:
Detailed derivations for the VP locus and the LL locus can be found in the Appendix.
It is easy to see that the LL locus is upward sloping in ( ; n)-space, with n starting from 0 when = 0 and approaching a …nite upper bound as approaches in…nity. The LL locus is concave. To rule out possibility of non-degenerate multiple equilibria, we assume that " > 1 so that the VP locus is upward sloping and convex, with n starting from 0 when = 0 and approaching in…nity as approaches in…nity. The interior intersection of VP and LL loci de…nes the steady-state values of and n (see Figure 2 ). With the steady-state values of and n solved, the rest of endogenous variables can be derived in a recursive manner.
Finally, applying the modi…ed golden rule, the steady-state capital-labor ratio becomes:
which is negatively related to the wage discount D (g). The aggregate real output is:
which also depends on the wage discount negatively. Additionally, we can derive economic welfare measured by steady-state lifetime utility facing the representative large household:
Comparative Statics
We are now prepared for a complete examination of the real e¤ect of money. To begin, let us focus on the benchmark case with proportional money injections. This is an important benchmark not only because it has been commonly used in the literature but also because it removes any arbitrary redistribution between …rms and household as a result of money injections -in this case, the seigniorage tax collected by the monetary authority is fully refunded to money holders in a neutral, nondistortionary manner. 4 Thus, under this benchmark money injection rule, we can study the real e¤ect of money purely through the neoclassical channel via capital accumulation and the channel via costly job search and vacancy creation highlighted in this paper.
Recall that under the proportional money injection rule, F (g) = 1 and hence,
which is strictly increasing in g as long as + + > ". Diagrammatically, the line VCER in this benchmark case rotates down as g increases. The intuition for the rotation is as follows. As money growth rate increases, the shadow cost of employment tends to increase (see the coe¢ cient of w on the RHS of 41) because the wage payment is subject to the CIA constraint. For any …xed D < "( + + ) , the wage rate, w, needs to drop to compensate the tendency for the increase in the shadow cost. Under the condition > "( + + ) (easily satis…ed when " < 1 and + is small relative to as in our calibration), the two lines intersect with VCER ‡atter than WD.
Intuitively, since in our benchmark model money is injected in a lump-sum fashion that is ex post proportional to the beginning-of-period money holdings by …rms and consumers, the seigniorage tax imposed on …rms and consumers are fully refunded ex post. However, when …rms are making decision, the injections are taken as given. When money growth increases, the cost of holding money facing …rms (and consumers) rises. Other things being equal, the pro…t is lower. Since employment is a state variable in a labor search model (and cannot be adjusted within a period), the wage will be renegotiated. Given the outside option of zero pro…t for the …rm, the …rm must bargain down the real wage, leading to higher wage discount. Since the wage discount is equivalent to the fraction of employment used to maintain and create vacancy, this employment fraction would be higher, which in turn improves job matching and raises future employment. Mathematically, D(g), which has the alternative interpretation as the vacancy creation-employment ratio, is an increasing function of money growth rate, g. In other words, higher money growth shifts employment from production to non-production activities and raises steady state employment through enhanced job matching. This establishes the new channel that an increase in money growth encourages vacancy creation and raises job matches.
Also recall that the VP locus varies with the money injection rule only throughD(g), which in the benchmark case becomes:
.
The LL locus is now,
It is easily seen that more rapid money supply growth (higher g) will cause both VP and LL to shift downward, hence n could either increase or decrease ( Figure 2 depicts the situation when n increases as g rises). Intuitively, a higher money growth rate increases the cost of holding money, thereby reducing real money balances held by households and …rms and restricting purchases that require cash in advance. On the one hand, households are forced to lower their consumption c. On the other hand, …rms are forced to shift from production to non-production activities, by devoting more manpower to vacancy creation and maintenance (which can be seen from (48) that higher g
n , thus raising v for a given level of employment n). As a result, the job …nding rate facing each searching worker is higher (referred to as the matching externality e¤ect). While the shift from production to non-production activities lowers …rm's labor demand, a higher job …nding rate raises job matches and the steady-state level of employment. When agents'responses to labormarket frictions are su¢ ciently strong, the matching externality e¤ect dominates the conventional labor demand e¤ect and, in this case, equilibrium employment rises. Thus, our model provide a channel through which higher money growth may induce higher output. Particularly from (46), if an increase in steady in ‡ation raises n more signi…cantly than raising D (g), it could lead to a higher real output. This is more likely to arise if labor-market frictions are severe and wage bargains are not e¢ cient. Moreover, a higher job …nding rate also reduces job search time. From (47), should the reduction in total job search time, measured by (1 n)S = n , outweigh the rise in work time n, leisure would increase. Thus, despite the loss in consumption, a representative household's welfare may be higher as a result of higher leisure.
While the presence of search friction may induce a positive real e¤ect of steady in ‡ation similar to the …ndings in the asset substitution setup of Mundell (1963) and Tobin (1965) , the channels are very di¤erent. 5 Indeed, both the matching-externality-induced positive e¤ect of money growth on employment and the search-time-induced positive e¤ect of money growth on welfare highlighted in our model are absent in a conventional frictionless Walrasian economy.
Notably, when bargaining is ine¢ cient, a more likely scenario in developing countries, …rms expand their activity in creating and maintaining vacancies as money growth increases in the benchmark case when the …rms'outside option is zero pro…t and when money injections are proportional to agents'respective holdings. While our result depends on …rms'outside option, it remains valid, by continuity argument, even if we use a small positive pro…t as the outside option for the …rms.
Thus, the remaining issue left to be addressed is how much our result would depends on the money injection rule, which we now study.
From (36), the relative money injection to …rms is captured by,
households only
In the former case with injections to …rms only, we arrive at:
It is clear thatD(g) is increasing in g, so the VP shifts downward unambiguously as g increases; moreover, the LL locus shifts upward (see the Appendix for a graphical illustration). Therefore the e¤ect of money growth on employment is unambiguously positive when money injections are distributed to …rms. In the latter case with injections to households only, we have:
Thus, the VP locus is independent of the money growth rate, whereas the LL locus shifts downward.
As a result, higher money growth reduces employment unambiguously. Notably, because the new channel emphasized in this paper must be through the vacancy creation and production tradeo¤, such a trade-o¤ requires …rms to receive money injections -otherwise, monetary expansion can never be bene…cial for …rms. This is why monetary expansion always hurt employment when money is only injected to households. Of course, just how much such injections to …rms are needed for monetary expansion to be potentially welfare-enhancing is a quantitative issue, to which we now turn.
Calibration and Welfare Analysis
We calibrate the benchmark economy with parameter values matching the U.S. annual data over the post-WWII period. We set the subjective rate of time preference to = 2%, the rate of capital depreciation to = 3:5% and the capital share to = 0:38. As it can be seen below,
these parameter values will yield reasonable consumption-output ratio and real rental rate. Over the period mentioned above, the money growth rate is averaged about g = 6:5%. De…ning the search intensity augmented unemployment measure as u = s (1 n)), we can calibrate n + u to match the labor force participation rate of 61:5%. Based on Shimer (2005), the monthly separation rate is 3:4%, the monthly job …nding rate is 45%, and the matching elasticity is = 0:72. These Figure 3) , the household-to-…rm money demand ratio in the U.S. from 1952 to 1997, excluding the volatile high in ‡ation period during the oil crises, is mostly between 1 and 2 (32 out of 35 years). Our calibrated household-to-…rm money demand ratio falls right in the range. This calibrated ratio corresponds to a …rm money injection ratio of F = 44:9868% in the benchmark and we will check how our quantitative results may change in response to di¤erent …rm injection ratios. While the capitallabor ratio yields a realistic real rental rate of 5:5%, the consumption-output ratio of approximately 75% is also reasonable.
We can now revisit the issue of optimum quantity of money. Given the calibration above ( = = 0:999234) following Shimer's normalization, the Cobb-Douglas matching function implies that as the money growth rate varies slightly from benchmark of 6:5%, either or will hit the upper bound of unity. In particular, we …nd that the only range of money growth rates relevant for our consideration is [0:06386; 0:065113], within which the welfare declines as the money growth rate rises. It is thus safe to say that the benchmark money growth rate is close to the optimum.
The question on the optimal in ‡ation rate would become much more interesting if an economy features a less e¢ cient labor market. Consider for illustrative purposes a modi…ed benchmark that is identical to the U.S. economy except a lower job …nding rate at = 0:8 0:999234 (which corresponds to a monthly job …nding rate of 12:5% or an average unemployment spell of 8 months). With more labor-market frictions, the optimal in ‡ation rate turns out to be g = 7:5592%, which is signi…cantly above the benchmark rate of 6:5% (see Figure 3 ). This suggests that developing countries may have an optimal in ‡ation rate that is higher than in developed countries if the former has a labor market with greater frictions. Notably, Khan and Senhadji (2000) reach a similar conclusion for in ‡ation in an empirical investigation in terms of economic growth. In Table 1 , we compare key variables under the benchmark money growth rate and the optimal money growth rate. As discussed in the analytical results above, higher money growth induces the …rms to put more e¤ort in vacancy creation, thereby raising the job …nding rate. Under our benchmark parametrization, the matching externality e¤ect is dominant and thus higher money growth leads to higher employment. The trade-o¤ is to reduce consumption and output, though the magnitude is negligible due to the opposing e¤ects on the employment rate (positive) and the capital-labor ratio (negative).
Since the betterment in job matching as a result of a suitable increase in money growth generates a large time saving e¤ect in job search by the households, it results in su¢ ciently higher leisure to outweigh the modest drop in consumption. As a consequence, an increase in money growth from the benchmark rate of 6:5% to g enhances economic welfare.
We now return to the issue concerning how the welfare result may change under di¤erent money injection rules. It is best illustrated by solving quantitatively the optimal in ‡ation rate g when the …rm injection ratio F rises from 0 to 1. As depicted in Figure 4 , we can see that the optimal in ‡ation rate is positive for all F > 2:2602%. Recall from the previous subsection that when money is only injected to households ( F = 0), the VP locus is independent of the money growth rate and the matching externality e¤ect through vacancy creation and production is fully shut down. Thus, monetary expansion always hurt employment and positive in ‡ation can never be welfare-enhancing.
When a small amount of money is injected to …rms, there is a positive e¤ect of money growth in conjunction with a negative e¤ect via labor-leisure trade-o¤. As F exceeds the above-mentioned threshold, the optimal money growth rate becomes positive. Our numerical analysis shows that even when F is at an extremely low value of 3%, the optimal in ‡ation is about 5:4%, far above zero.
When F rises to about 9%, the optimal in ‡ation rate increases to 16:9%. Afterward, the optimal in ‡ation starts declining, falling to 3:6% as F = 1 where money is injected to …rms only. This humpshaped result can be understood as follows. As F continues to rise, the rebate of the seigniorage tax to households declines and the detrimental labor-leisure trade-o¤ e¤ect increases rapidly, eventually dominating the matching externality e¤ect through vacancy creation and production. Thus, the optimal money growth rate starts to decrease when F becomes too large. Overall, not only is the optimal in ‡ation rate positive for most injection schemes, but over a wide range of F 2 (3:2%; 53%) the optimal in ‡ation rate turns out to exceed the benchmark value of 6:5%. Thus, while we need "some"money injection to …rms to ensure that the vacancy creation-production channel can work, we do not need "much"of such injections quantitatively. Notably, while too much of such injections would lower the optimal rate of in ‡ation, we …nd that when money is injected to the …rms only, the resulting welfare with the optimal in ‡ation rate of 3.6% is higher than under other injection rules (see Figure 4) . This con…rms that, in our calibrated economy, the channel through …rms'vacancy creation and production is the ultimate force driving the welfare outcomes.
In summary, the Friedman rule does not hold in our economy. Note that in a standard CIA model with labor-leisure choice in the absence of labor market frictions, the optimal rate of money growth can never be positive (as documented in Wang and Yip 1992, Gomme 1993, and many others). Moreover, even in the case with a positive real e¤ect of steady in ‡ation under our setting, there is a crucial di¤erence between ours and the Mundell-Tobin model. In their framework, higher steady in ‡ation causes a substitution from real balances to capital, implying a higher capital-labor ratio in the steady state. In ours, higher steady in ‡ation induces the …rms to put more manpower in managing vacancy, which leads to more job matches and increase in employment, thus lowering the capital-labor ratio in the steady state. Our result is found very robust to a wide range of money injection rules.
Further Discussion
In this section, we check the robustness of our main …ndings to alternative CIA constraints or alternative distribution of matching surplus, under the benchmark proportional money injection rule. We also check the validity of our main …ndings remain in a second-best world with pre-existing distortionary taxes.
Alternative Cash-in-Advance Constraints
Consider generalized CIA constraints, where a fraction q F of …rm's spending in capital rental and a fraction q H of household's spending in capital investment require cash:
In the steady state, …rm's capital demand becomes:
where
trade-o¤ and labor-leisure trade-o¤ are given by,
On the …rm side, (51) implies that money growth generates an additional negative e¤ect on capital demand as a result of a higher user cost of capital. On the household side, the steady-state real interest rate under generalized CIA constraints is higher than the benchmark case (see (52)), which discourages capital accumulation; the marginal bene…t of labor is lower than the benchmark case (see (53)), which lowers employment. Not surprisingly, both favor a reversed Tobin e¤ect as in the canonical Walrasian setups in Stockman (1981) and Wang and Yip (1992) . However, one may inquire how large these negative output e¤ects of money growth will be. We argue that they are indeed modest. On the one hand, capital rental is much smaller than the wage payment while capital investment is much smaller than consumption. On the other, the fractions q 
Alternative Distribution of Matching Surplus
We turn now to examining whether applying Hosios' rule of e¢ cient matching would change our main …ndings. Under Hosios'rule, the equilibrium sharing of the matching surplus will be tied to the matching elasticities. In the benchmark case, the zero pro…t condition (37) together with the modi…ed golden rule (31) yields the equilibrium wage as a fraction of the marginal product. Under
Hosios'rule, worker's wage (denoted w ) is lower than that in the benchmark case (the proof of all the results in this subsection is relegated to the Appendix):
which is a weighted average of the competitive wage rate and a lower value, analogous to the …ndings in Andolfatto (1996) . We can rewrite (54) as: w = w, where w = 1 n M P N and
Due to the double holdup problems, this wage ratio generally di¤ers from one. In the absence of the double holdup problems, the bargained wage rate equals the competitive wage and thus = 1.
Under Hosios'rule, the labor-leisure trade-o¤ (LL) locus need be modi…ed as:
where measures the fraction of labor devoted to vacancy creation and maintenance and is a function of ( ; n),
While the LHS of (56) is decreasing in and increasing in n, the RHS is increasing in and may increase or decrease in n. Thus, we cannot pin down the slope of the LL locus. Should the double holdup problems be absent, the RHS reduces to one and the LL locus is upward-sloping. When the household's bargaining power is weaker (smaller ), the LL locus is steeper.
Under e¢ cient bargain, the VP locus becomes,
1-
This relationship captures the production-vacancy creation trade-o¤ under e¢ cient bargain. When " ( + + ) < , both the LHS and the RHS are increasing in and decreasing in n. As a result, we cannot determine the slope of the modi…ed VP locus. However, if the double holdup problems are absent, then the RHS reduces to one and the modi…ed VP locus is still upward-sloping. When the household's bargaining power is weaker (smaller ), the VP locus becomes ‡atter.
Under the calibrated value of bargaining parameter = 0:72, the double holdup problem is not negligible. In the calibrated equilibrium mimicking the post-WWII U.S. economy with a lower job …nding rate = 0:8 0:999234, the LL locus is still upward sloping but the VP locus becomes downward sloping. As money growth increases, the VP locus shifts downward and the LL locus also shifts downward but barely. As a result, and n both decrease in response to higher money growth.
Hence, the optimal in ‡ation rate is now much lower than the benchmark case (g = 0:002149) when hits the upper bound of unity.
Second-Best Tax Incidence Analysis
One may now inquire whether our main …ndings remain valid in a second-best world with an array of nonzero pre-existing taxes where a full access to the lump-sum tax is unavailable. 6 We are particularly interested in comparing the in ‡ation tax with either a consumption tax or a general income tax.
Denote the consumption tax and general income tax rates as c and y , respectively, and the exogenous government spending as G t (which is for simplicity assumed to be nonproductive and to yield no utility). Then household's budget constraint (6) is modi…ed as:
where the direct money injection is now removed to be consistent with the assumption in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996) . The CIA constraint (8) becomes:
where it is reasonable to assume the sales taxes are paid in cash when consumption purchases are made. The resource constraint (11) is now,
where, in the absence of a lump-sum tax and under the assumption of proportional money injections, the following government budget constraint is met:
where the last term captures the (real) in ‡ation tax on …rm's wage spending and household's consumption purchase.
While …rm's optimizing conditions are all unchanged (as the removal of the direct money injection from …rm's ‡ow pro…t would not alter any decisions), some of household's optimizing conditions and equilibrium conditions need be modi…ed. As a consequence, several steady-state equilibrium relationships are di¤erent from their benchmark counterparts. For brevity, we only highlight a few key relationships and relegate all mathematical details to the Appendix. While the LL locus is unchanged (all tax e¤ects cancelled out on the margin because y applies on both capital income and wage income), the VP locus is now modi…ed as:
. 6 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for alerting us to this useful exercise.
where the wage discount D is now a function of (g; y ),
Note that the consumption tax c does not appear in the steady state relationships (VP and LL loci) or in the wage discount expression. An increase in the general income tax y has two e¤ects on the …rms'vacancy creation-production trade-o¤, both through the wage discount. First, it raises the real interest rate (r = ) (1 + g) 1, thereby raising the opportunity cost of …nancing wage payments due to the presence of the …rm'CIA constraint and leading to a higher wage discount. The resulting increase in the wage discount through both channels in turn leads to a lower level of employment (VP locus shifts down). Notably, while the in ‡ation tax also a¤ect the level of employment via the nominal interest rate channel, it does not have the additional e¤ect via the real interest rate as does the general income tax.
To evaluate the welfare e¤ects of money growth and taxes, we express the capital-labor and consumption-capital ratios as follows:
Thus, the welfare measured by steady-state lifetime utility is decomposed into four components,
Through the wage discount channel, an increase in y lowers the capital-labor ratio. Additionally, y also has a direct negative e¤ect on the capital-labor ratio via the real interest rate channel (( + )=(1 y )). By contrast, neither the wage discount nor the capital-labor ratio is a¤ected by the consumption tax c -the only e¤ect of c is on the consumption-capital ratio: by taxing consumption purchases, this ratio is unambiguously lower. Turning now to the e¤ects on leisure (1 n n ), we note that there is an extensive margin (via 1 n) and an intensive margin (by economizing job search, captured by n ). As discussed above, both g and y have positive impacts on the level of employment, thus lowing leisure on the extensive margin. Similar to the analysis using Figure 2 , however, both tax instruments induce large downward shifts in the VP locus accompanied by small shifts in the LL locus, leading to lower employment-job …nding rate ratio (n= ). Thus, an increase in g or y economizes job search and raises leisure on the intensive margin. In our calibrated economy, we always …nd the intensive margin to dominate the extensive margin. We thus expect that g and y will generate positive leisure e¤ects in the steady state.
In summary, an increase in the consumption tax does not a¤ect any other economic aggregate but the consumption-output ratio negatively, thereby reducing welfare unambiguously. A higher general income tax or a higher in ‡ation tax, on the one hand, raises employment and (most plausibly) leisure, and reduces the capital-labor ratio, on the other. Thus, both a¤ects welfare ambiguously even when their e¤ects on leisure are dominated by the intensive margin.
We recalibrate the modi…ed benchmark economy (with = 0:8 0:999234) under the zero pro…t setup and obtain = 0:316530, = 0:162182 and " = 0:371870. While is very close to the modi…ed benchmark …gure, and " are both lower than their counterparts. Concerning the secondbest tax incidence analysis, we set the pre-existing in ‡ation tax rate the same as before (g = 6:5%) and choose the consumption and general income tax rates as c = 5% and y = 20% (which are commonly chosen in the dynamic tax incidence literature calibrating the U.S. economy). These yield a government spending G = 0:295544.
We conduct three government revenue-neutral tax incidence exercises. In the …rst, we …x the consumption tax rate at c = 5% and G = 0:295544 to maintain revenue-neutral. We …nd that the optimal tax mix is: (g ; y ) = (10:57%; 14:20%). In the second exercise, we …x the general income tax rate at y = 20% and again G = 0:295544 to obtain the optimal tax mix (g ; c ) = (8:64%; 0:36%).
These two pair-wise exercises suggest a shift toward the in ‡ation tax. Nevertheless it is never optimal to fully replace consumption or general income taxes by the in ‡ation tax. Finally, in the last exercise, we calculate the global optimal tax mix given G = 0:295544 to obtain (g ; y ; c ) = (10:48%; 0%; 26:77%). Notice that under the pre-existing tax rates given above, in ‡ation, general income and consumption taxes account for about 24:9%, 66:7% and 8:4%, respectively, of the total government revenue. In the optimal tax mix scheme, their revenue shares become 49:7%, 0% and 50:3%, respectively. To understand the global optimal tax mix result, we note that the direct negative e¤ect of the general income tax is quantitatively too large to be compensated by the positive employment and (most plausibly) leisure e¤ects. As a consequence, it is optimal for income to be tax-exempted. Thus, when it is optimal to fully eliminate the distortionary general income tax, tax burdens must fall on the in ‡ation and the consumption taxes. However, the welfare-cost trade-o¤ between the in ‡ation tax and the consumption tax is never strong enough to lead to an optimal tax scheme with one tax being fully replaced by another.
To the end, we compare our …ndings with those established by Chari, Christiano and Kehoe 
Concluding Remarks
By constructing a monetary growth model where cash is required for wage payments and consumption purchases, we have shown that labor market frictions play an important role in creating new channels through which steady in ‡ation in ‡uences the real activity in the long run. The key elements of labor market frictions considered in our benchmark framework include costly vacancy creation and job search as well as imperfect job matches. While there is a prototypical detrimental e¤ect of money growth via labor-leisure trade-o¤, we have identi…ed, with at least some moderate amount of money being injected to …rms, there exists a positive real e¤ect due to the encouragement of steady in ‡ation to create new vacancies and to raise job matches.
Some valuable lessons from our calibration exercises are summarized as follows.
When the economy exhibits relatively low in ‡ation, positive real e¤ects of money growth may arise in which higher steady in ‡ation, via more vacancy creation and better job matches, raises employment and saves job search time. In this case, the optimal rate of in ‡ation is positive, departing from the Friedman rule.
When wages are determined by competitive pro…t conditions, the greater labor-market frictions, the larger the positive real e¤ect of money growth and the optimal in ‡ation rate.
When bargaining ine¢ ciency is removed under Hosios' rule in an economy with signi…cant labor-market frictions, the bene…t of money growth is signi…cantly reduced. Under our calibrated economy with a job …nding rate 20% lower than one in the U.S., the real e¤ect of money growth is almost absent and the optimal in ‡ation rate is close to zero.
Even in a second-best world with pre-existing distortionary consumption and general income taxes, the Friedman rule still fails to hold under our benchmark parametrization with wages being determined by competitive pro…t conditions. Under our calibrated economy with a job …nding rate 20% lower than one in the U.S., it is optimal to fully eliminate general income tax and to have positive in ‡ation and consumption tax.
Our quantitative results are generally consistent with recent empirical studies investigating the long-run money-output relationship.
We have focused on providing a thorough characterization of the real e¤ects of steady in ‡ation via the labor-leisure-search trade-o¤ in the presence of labor market frictions and have been abstracting any pecuniary costs associated with job search and vacancy creation. Our model may be generalized to include such costs. In doing so, one may mimic better the real world and conduct calibration analysis matching better with the observed rates of job turnover and unemployment.
Another simplifying assumption is the utility function speci…cation. Should the utility function be nonhomothetic (in consumption and search-intensity augmented e¤ective leisure), the employment rate may a¤ect the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor di¤erently and hence steady in ‡ation may a¤ect the ratio of household to …rm money holding, depending on the severity of labor market frictions. This extension may thus provide a plausible explanation for the sharp movements in the ratio of money holding over the past few decades in the U.S. Finally, our framework is ready for a comprehensive study of monetary transmission over the business cycle. In particular, one may set up the stochastic processes for the technological factor (A) and the monetary growth rate (g) and then characterize monetary transmission by log-linearizing the system governing the equilibrium dynamics. Search frictions may be viewed as "real rigidities" that may permit a better …t with the data in impulse responses of output, employment and factor returns with respect to monetary shocks. 
Note that the subscript t is no longer necessary and is dropped. The …rm decides on (i) how many vacancies to create (v); (ii) how much capital to rent (k), and (iii) how much real money balance to acquire (z F ). Let F denote the …rm's vector of state variables this period, namely, F = (n; m F ). Let F 0 denote the same vector next period. The …rst-order conditions are:
Equation (58) states that for optimality, the bene…t from creating additional vacancy in order to make new hires should equal the cost in terms of sta¤-time necessary to make these vacancies available to the searching workers. In Section 3 of this Appendix, we derive the second-order condition for vacancy creation, which is then veri…ed in the numerical exercises. Equation (59) is the standard capital demand equation. Equation (60) indicates that the return from acquiring additional real money balance this period, which comes in the form of a more relaxed CIA constraint next period, should equal the opportunity cost of holding money. In addition, the optimality also requires the Benveniste-Scheinkman conditions, which can be simpli…ed as follows by making use of the …rst order conditions above:
2 (n; m
which, when using (60), gives rise to:
Optimizing Conditions for a Representative Household
Denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the household's CIA constraint H . By substituting the evolution equations into the household's next-period value function, the representative household's optimization problem can be written in Bellman equation form as follows:
Let H denote the vector of state variables this period, namely, H = (k; n; m H ). Let H 0 denote the triplets next period. The …rst-order conditions are:
In equation (63), the appearance of H captures the additional shadow cost of increasing consumption due to the presence of the CIA constraint. Equation (64) states that the employment gain next period from a marginal increase in search intensity this period equals the disutility from the corresponding reduction in leisure. Equation (65) equates the bene…t of acquiring an additional real money balance that relaxes the CIA constraint for the next period, to the opportunity cost of foregone capital accumulation. The Benveniste-Scheinkman conditions are given as follows:
3. The Second-order condition for vacancy creation:
From the optimization problem is given by,
The …rst-order condition with respect to v is:
while the second-order condition requires:
Note that de…ning the vacancy cost ratio as V CR (v)
n , we then have:
Thus, the second-order condition requires:
which we verify in our numerical exercises.
4.
The Vacancy-Production Trade-o¤ , the Relative Money Injection to Firms, the Zero Pro…t Condition and the Labor-leisure Trade-o¤ Equations:
Substituting (60) and = g into (62), one obtains: F = r + (1 + r)g: This expression can then be used in (61) and the resulting equation can be combined with (58) to yield:
which can be simpli…ed to arrive at the vacancy creation-production trade-o¤ relationship (35) after replacing by n=v.
From (26), (28) and (29), we obtain:
Substituting (34) into the latter expression, we can derive (36). With this, (37) follows immediately. Next, from (65) and (68), we have:
which can be substituted into equation (63) to arrive at:
Combining this latter equation with (64) and (67), one obtains:
which can be simpli…ed to produce the labor-leisure trade-o¤ equation (38).
The Wage Discount Function:
Equations (39) and (41) can be combined to yield,
or, manipulating,
which can be simpli…ed to generate the wage discount function (42).
The VP Locus:
From (35) and (39), we have:
or, by eliminating M P N and using (21), (22) and (40),
which can be simpli…ed to yield the VP locus (43). Non-negativity of employment requires that
7. The LL Locus:
From labor-leisure decision (38),
From (37), (31) , (26) , (28),
or,
Equating the two expressions to eliminate w yields,
which generates the LL locus (44).
8. Intertemporal and Labor-Leisure Trade-o¤ s under Generalized CIA Constraints:
Under generalized CIA constraints, some of household's optimizing conditions need be modi…ed as follows:
Using the …rst three equalities together with (64) to express H , 1 (H 0 ), 2 (H 0 ), and 3 (H 0 ) in terms of U 1 and U 2 , and substituting these results into the last two equations, we obtain modi…ed intertemporal and labor-leisure trade-o¤s, (52) and (53).
9. Diagrammatic analysis when money injections are distributed to …rms: When money injections are distributed to …rms only, the VP and LL loci are depicted in the following. Recall that the competitive wage rate under zero pro…t is given by w = 1 n M P N , where
. Denote the e¢ cient matching wage rate under Hosios' rule as w . Since the ‡ow cost of vacancy creation is dy=dv = v M P N , we can compute …rm's ‡ow pro…t per match as follows:
Firms'unmatched value ( U ) and matched value ( M ) accrued from a successful bargain with their employees can be speci…ed as:
In the absence of …rm's entry cost, we have:
Thus, applying the functional form of (v) and (21), we use (69) and (70) to derive:
Combining (63) and (68) and making use of (65), we can eliminate H to obtain 1 (H 0 ) = 3 (H 0 ) = 1 1+ U 1 . In the steady state, we can substitute the previous expression into (67) to derive:
(1 + ) (1 s)U 2 + w 1 + U 1 .
Equations (27) and (30) yield: c = k + w n.
From the competitive wage rate equation mentioned above and (31), we have:
Now, by applying (21), (27) and = g; and making use of the two equations above, the matching surplus accrued to a household from a successful match (in unit of goods) can be derived as:
In a Nash bargain, the wage is solved by maximizing the joint surplus, taking as given the competitive rental rate, matching probabilities and state variables. Hosios' rule implies that to reach the bargaining frontier, the bargaining shares have to be the same as the powers in the matching function. Thus, the bargaining problem is given by,
Noting that v = n is taken as given (as do , k; M P N and w) and thus both S F and S H are linear in w . As a consequence, the …rst-order condition to the Nash bargain problem exhibits the conventional form:
which, together with (72) and (75), implies:
1 + 1 " n w w = (1 )
Thus, the wage can be solved as in (54).
Next, we will reduce all the steady state conditions into a 2 2 system of equations in ( ; n). From (38), (21) and (73) 
From (22) and (23), = B 1=(1 ) =(1 ) and v = n , so we have:
, which is an increasing function of n and . Also, one can get the shares of employees in creating/maintaining vacancies and in production:
#" ( ; n); n n = 1 ( ; n);
where is increasing in and decreasing in n. Substituting these expressions into (55) yields:
(1 )( + ) (1 n)(1 ) n(1+ )(1+g) 
Comparing (78) with (77) ; we obtain (56). We now turn to another fundamental relationship, using the vacancy creation condition (35) , which can be rewritten as:
which is increasing in n and . This expression can be compared with (78) to yield (57).
Sensitivity Analysis:
While our pre-set parameters in the calibration exercises are all justi…ed, some of the calibration criteria and some of the calibrated parameter values may be argued questionable. We therefore perform a sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of our results. In particular, we consider the following alternatives:
Since our calibration of the labor market follows the recent work by Shimer (2005), we for consistency set, in the benchmark case, the matching technology parameter = 0:72 as in Shimer, which is arguably high as compared to Blanchard and Diamond (1990) with = 0:40 and Hall (2008) with = 0:54. In the …rst sensitivity analysis, we recalibrate to the lowest value 0:40.
We calibrated B based on an assumed vacancy-unemployed search worker ratio of one as in Shimer (2005). We now explore the alternative by allowing B to be 10% below or above its benchmark value.
We also allow four other crucial parameters to be 10% below or above its benchmark value to check how robust our main …ndings are.
The sensitivity analysis results are reported in Table 2 below. Our results deliver two important messages. First, under the zero pro…t setup with an ine¢ cient wage bargain, the Friedman rule is never valid in a wide set of parametrization. The more frictional the labor market is (lower matching e¢ cacy B, higher job separation , or more costly vacancy creation ), the greater the optimal in ‡ation rate will be. Second, the optimal in ‡ation rate is always lower when the wage bargain is e¢ cient, satisfying Hosios' rule. In some cases, the Friedman rule may hold with an e¢ cient wage bargain -it is the case when the matching elasticity of unemployed workers is low (low ), the matching e¢ cacy is low (low B), the job separation rate is low (low ), the vacancy creation is more costly (high ), the scale economies of vacancy creation is low (high "), and when welfare is more sensitive to leisure (high ). It is of particular interest to note that when = 0:40, there are in fact two nondegenerate equilibria. The one that is not reported in Table 2 involves an unrealistically low employment rate (about 17%) and implausibly high unemployment duration (about 7:5 years). 7 Table 2 In the second-best tax incidence model, three household's optimizing conditions, namely, (63), (66) and (67), must be modi…ed: U 1 (c; (1 s)(1 n)) = (1 + c ) In the steady state, (27) , (29), (30), (31) , and (38) become: Repeating the same procedures as in appendix sections 3 and 4 above, we can derive the VP and LL loci. In addition to those steady-state expressions reported in the main text, the following steady-state relationships also di¤er from the benchmark ones: (1 D) n.
